Contextualized moral inference by Xie, Jing Yi et al.
Contextualized moral inference
Jing Yi Xie , Graeme Hirst , and Yang Xu
Department of Computer Science, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada
jingyi.xie@mail.utoronto.ca, {gh,yangxu}@cs.toronto.edu
Abstract
Developing moral awareness in intelligent sys-
tems has shifted from a topic of philosophical
inquiry to a critical and practical issue in arti-
ficial intelligence over the past decades. How-
ever, automated inference of everyday moral
situations remains an under-explored problem.
We present a text-based approach that predicts
peoples intuitive judgment of moral vignettes.
Our methodology builds on recent work in
contextualized language models and textual
inference of moral sentiment. We show that
a contextualized representation offers a sub-
stantial advantage over alternative representa-
tions based on word embeddings and emotion
sentiment in inferring human moral judgment,
evaluated and reflected in three independent
datasets from moral psychology. We discuss
the promise and limitations of our approach to-
ward automated textual moral reasoning.
1 Introduction
The relation of morality and computational in-
telligence has been a topic of philosophical in-
quiry among the early pioneers of artificial intel-
ligence (Turing, 1950; Wiener, 1960). Recent ad-
vances in artificial intelligence in areas such as au-
tonomous driving makes it desirable for intelligent
systems to develop moral awareness (e.g., Awad
et al., 2018). The ability to reason about every-
day moral situations is one key aspect that dis-
tinguishes humans from machines, and language
provides a natural conduit for generic moral in-
ference. Here we explore methodologies for au-
tomated inference of moral vignettes from textual
input.
There exist multiple schools of thought on hu-
man morality. Some theories present morality as
a form of deliberate reasoning, while others assert
that moral judgment is driven largely by emotion.
Recent research from moral psychology has sug-
gested that morality depends on five to six foun-
dational dimensions shared across cultures (Haidt
and Joseph, 2004; Haidt et al., 2007; Graham
et al., 2013). As such, morality may be viewed
as intuitive judgement that nevertheless depends
on fine-grained categorical inference. Our empha-
sis here departs from the theoretical debate and in-
stead focuses on examining the possibility of ma-
chine inference for daily moral situations.
Given a generic vignette such as “if you tell
a secret someone told you”, we ask whether
the human-judged moral category of the vignette
(e.g., loyalty in this case) can be automatically
inferred from text alone. One important aspect
we explore here is whether the moral vignettes
can be represented effectively, and in particular
we examine several alternative representations in-
cluding the recent contextualized language mod-
els (e.g., Reimers and Gurevych, 2019). An-
other avenue we explore is whether these repre-
sentations can be generalized accurately onto fine-
grained moral categories (e.g., fairness, care, loy-
alty) above and beyond the binary distinction be-
tween right and wrong (e.g., Schramowski et al.,
2019), given only a limited number of human ex-
amples as training data.
2 Related work
A few disparate ideologies concerning morality
have prevailed in philosophy. Immanuel Kant pro-
posed that morality is grounded in reasoning, and
that reflecting on principles is how moral judg-
ment ought to be made (Kant, 1785). To the
contrary, Hume argued that reasoning was second
to emotion: It is feelings and emotions that pri-
marily guide us in our moral judgment (Hume,
1751). The recent advent of the Moral Founda-
tions Theory (MFT) (Graham et al., 2013) presents
a modular view of morality based on a core set
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of dimensions or foundations. Examples of such
foundations include care, fairness, loyalty, author-
ity, purity, etc. The moral foundations dictio-
nary (MFD) (Graham et al., 2009) was created as
a linguistic resource to bridge moral psychology
and natural language processing, where key lexi-
cal terms were listed under each moral foundation.
The MFT and MFD have been the basis of sev-
eral studies in natural language processing, which
have typically focused on predicting moral sen-
timent from social media text (Mooijman et al.,
2018; Lin et al., 2018). Other lines of work
have explored moral rhetoric in political discourse
(Garten et al., 2016), inference of moral senti-
ment change from diachronic word embeddings
(Xie et al., 2019), classification of moral sentiment
from tweets (Hoover et al., 2020), and analyses of
moral bias toward right or wrong using contex-
tualized language models SBERT (Schramowski
et al., 2019). Our study extends this line of re-
search by exploring textual inference of moral vi-
gnettes that often entail complex world knowl-
edge, and we contribute a set of empirical data col-
lected from moral psychology experiments which
are under-represented in the existing natural lan-
guage processing studies of morality.
3 Data
We collect text-based moral vignettes, each of
which refers to a scenario in the form of a
short text, e.g., “A guy cheats his family out of
their money and property” (Clifford et al., 2015).
Moral vignettes have traditionally been presented
as stimuli to study the bases of human moral judg-
ment in moral psychology. We collect vignettes
from the following three independent sources,
with their characteristics summarized in Table 1:
• Set 1 – Chadwick. Chadwick et al. (2006)
present a rich source of pretested behaviours,
each corresponding to either a positive or
negative example of the traits of honesty, loy-
alty, friendliness, charitableness.
• Set 2 – McCurrie. McCurrie et al. (2018)
provide video clips of moral stimuli that de-
pict violations or the five vice dimensions of
the Moral Foundations Theory: harm, unfair-
ness or cheating, disloyalty, anti-authority,
and (sexual) impurity. We use the textual de-
scription of the content from each video clip.
Table 1: Key characteristics of the moral vignette sets.
Set Size Polarity Categories
Chadwick 500 +ve/-ve honesty, loyalty,
friendliness, char-
itableness, coop-
erativeness
McCurrie 69 -ve MFT foundations
Clifford 132 -ve MFT foundations
Videos were sourced from YouTube and val-
idated through human ratings.
• Set 3 – Clifford. Clifford et al. (2015)
present a set of moral violations, each of
which is an infringement on one of the five
Moral Foundations. Vignettes were writ-
ten to incorporate a varied content and min-
imize overlap among the foundations. The
vignettes were validated through factor anal-
ysis and human participants.
For both vignette datasets associated with MFT,
we considered vignettes from the five categories
and excluded the sixth category, liberty. This is
in an effort to be consistent with the MFD v1.0
used in our models that does not contain words
pertaining to liberty.
The dataset is available here.
4 Methodology
We explore how various representations of moral
vignettes contribute to effective inference of hu-
man moral judgment. For each dataset, we trans-
form each textual scenario into each of the five
representations. We choose these representations
to reflect the most relevant aspects of human moral
judgment grounded in existing theories on moral
reasoning and emotion, and state-of-the-art lan-
guage models. Standard classification methods
are applied in 5-fold cross-validation of the result-
ing representations. Classes are determined by the
trait categorizations of the vignettes summarized
in Table 1. We evaluate model performance across
all permutations of the datasets (× 3), representa-
tional schemes (× 5), and classification methods
(× 4).
4.1 Representations
• Contextual Embeddings. Contextual em-
beddings capture meanings for words as a
function of their context. We use a pretrained
sentence-based BERT model to embed each
vignette (Reimers and Gurevych, 2019).
• Average Embeddings. As a baseline to
contextual embeddings, we take the aver-
age of word embeddings in a vignette. In
this approach, we consider scenarios as a
whole, drawing information from its back-
ground semantic knowledge. Embeddings
are pretrained using GloVe (Pennington et al.,
2014).
• Verb Embeddings. With verb embeddings,
we extract the root verb of a vignette and per-
form classification based solely on the root.
The root is determined through dependency
parsing (Manning et al., 2014). We also
use GloVe vectors to produce embeddings for
the verb. Deontological ethics (Kant, 1785;
Alexander and Moore, 2007) in particular is
fundamentally concerned with the inherent
rightness and wrongness of an action. Due
to the high variability in context, it is feasi-
ble that the verb is strong enough signal on
its own. For instance, “to kill” carries a heavy
negative association. In the majority of cases,
it is not necessary to know who or what is the
direct object.
• Moral Sentiment. We extend previous work
(Garten et al., 2018; Xie et al., 2019) to cre-
ate a representation grounded in the MFT. We
compute centroids c f for each foundation f .
The centroid is the mean of all word embed-
dings w f in f : c f = 1N ∑w f . The euclidean
distance to each centroid for each word vec-
tor wv in a vignette is then calculated. The
mean of these distances for each f is taken as
a feature e f : e f = ||w− c f ||2.
• Emotion. As theorized by Hume (1751),
emotion may play an integral role in how hu-
mans make moral judgment. We consider
representations based on the affective rat-
ings of individual ratings. We use the va-
lence, arousal and dominance mean scores
from (Warriner et al., 2013). Scores are then
averaged across all words in a vignette.
4.2 Classifiers
We use a range of standard models for classifica-
tion, exploiting various aspects of the data. Gaus-
sian Naive Bayes (NB) and Regression (LR) clas-
sifiers are used as standard methods. Also consid-
ered is a k Nearest Neighbors (kNN) model, which
makes predictions from local density. Although
we explored at various values for k, results shown
are for k = 5, which has proven robust against
all datasets. Additionally, SVM classifiers (SVC)
amenable to high-dimensional data (Suykens and
Vandewalle, 1999) are also considered.
5 Results
We summarize the results of model evaluation
against human judgement in Table 2. Given that
random chance is 10% for all datasets, the ma-
jority of models correlate with human judgment
substantially above chance. Despite limited train-
ing examples, the contextual embeddings yield the
best overall performance across the 3 datasets and
among the 5 representations, and this advantage
is robust across the 4 classification methods. This
may be a direct consequence of the rich seman-
tic information encoded into the contextual mod-
els, as well as its ability to capture multiple senses
of a word (Hewitt and Manning, 2019). Logis-
tic regression produces the highest accuracy in
most cases. A visual representation of the con-
textual embeddings is shown in Figure 1, which
displays the density of moral categories for the
vignettes, projected onto two dimensions using
TSNE (Maaten and Hinton, 2008). We observe
a clean delineation in the Chadwick set, suggest-
ing a division between vignettes that are morally
acceptable versus not. We also observe categori-
cal structure in the McCurrie set that illustrates a
fine-grained moral inferential capacity.
5.1 Error interpretation
To examine the limitations of the contextual ap-
proach, we extract errors in Table 3 under the
best performing logistic regression model. In sev-
eral examples, the model is misled by words that
are strongly associated with alternative categories.
For instance, “cheating” is in violation of fairness,
but the vignette is categorized as an infraction of
loyalty (row 4). Another common error is the han-
dling of negation (row 3), only some of which
were predicted correctly.
6 Conclusion
We present a first exploration of textual inference
for moral vignettes and demonstrate the effective-
ness and limitations of predicting human catego-
Figure 1: Projection of all vignette contextual embeddings onto a 2-D space. Example points are marked for each
dataset and category. In the Chadwick (binary) plot, “charitable”, “cooperative”, “friendly”, “honest” and “loyal”
labels are grouped as Positive.
Table 2: Performance by representation and classification method. Model accuracy is averaged over 5-fold cross-
validation.
Dataset Representation NB kNN LR SVC Mean accuracy (SD)
Chadwick Context. Embed. (SBERT) 44.80% 46.20% 51.80% 50.00% 48.20% (2.81%)
Chadwick Avg. Embed. (GloVe) 16.80% 14.00% 13.20% 6.80% 12.70% (3.66%)
Chadwick Verb Embed. (GloVe) 28.67% 27.45% 34.28% 30.67% 30.27% (2.58%)
Chadwick Moral Sentiment 11.40% 11.00% 8.40% 7.00% 9.45% (1.82%)
Chadwick Emotion 11.80% 9.40% 8.00% 12.60% 10.45% (1.84%)
Clifford Context. Embed. (SBERT) 58.68% 51.68% 65.79% 54.63% 57.70% (5.29%)
Clifford Avg. Embed. (GloVe) 24.37% 28.37% 32.32% 32.32% 29.34% (3.29%)
Clifford Verb Embed. (GloVe) 47.47% 30.21% 58.58% 46.53% 45.70% (10.11%)
Clifford Moral Sentiment 25.32% 38.11% 32.26% 32.26% 31.99% (4.53%)
Clifford Emotion 18.11% 15.16% 23.32% 27.26% 20.96% (4.66%)
McCurrie Context. Embed. (SBERT) 47.95% 38.21% 49.23% 42.82% 44.55% (4.38%)
McCurrie Avg. Embed. (GloVe) 35.00% 28.33% 37.95% 37.95% 34.81% (3.93%)
McCurrie Verb Embed. (GloVe) 36.54% 41.41% 47.56% 41.15% 41.67% (3.92%)
McCurrie Moral Sentiment 28.33% 31.67% 37.95% 37.95% 33.97% (4.15%)
McCurrie Emotion 36.28% 31.67% 37.95% 37.82% 35.93% (2.55%)
Table 3: Errors committed by the Contextual Embeddings representation under the logistic regression classifier.
Dataset Vignette Prediction Truth
Chadwick Holding back snide comments you have for a team member. Unfriendly Cooperative
Chadwick Helping someone with a course that they have difficulties with. Charitable Friendly
Chadwick Not offering service to someone who isn’t dressed up to par. Charitable Uncharitable
McCurrie A guy cheats his family out of their money and property. Fairness Loyalty
McCurrie A man takes drugs on a bus. Care Purity
McCurrie A basketball player yells at his coaches. Care Loyalty
Clifford A soccer player pretends to be seriously fouled by an opposing
player.
Authority Fairness
Clifford A man leaves his family business to go work for their main com-
petitor.
Care Loyalty
Clifford A Hollywood star agrees with a foreign dictator’s denunciation of
the US.
Authority Loyalty
rization of everyday moral situations under limited
training data. We show that an approach based
on contextualized representation offers a supe-
rior performance over alternative representations
based on existing theories of morality and non-
contextualized word embeddings. Future work
should explore common knowledge and reasoning
in moral inference beyond semantic information,
and our current study serves as a stepping stone
toward automated moral reasoning from text.
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